RE: POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS
Rail worker scrambled to save woman's life: Crew was testing warning system, let train pass
Believing they had fixed
malfunctioning railroad gates and warning lights, Canadian National Railway
workers let an Amtrak train pass through the intersection at full speed as a
test, only to watch it barrel into a car on the tracks and kill the driver
behind the wheel, according to sources involved in the accident probe.
Investigators interviewed a CN
worker who saw the line of vehicles converging on the University Park crossing
as the Chicago-bound train approached at 78 miles per hour, then ran
toward the SUV driven onto the tracks by Katie Lunn,
a Chicago dance instructor.
Desperately hoping to save her, the
worker got to within about 30 feet of Lunn's car when
it was broadsided by the passenger train Friday night.
"The CN crew came back
specifically to test the crossing system with that northbound Amtrak train
at about 9:30," said a rail safety investigator who spoke with the CN
technician who tried to save Lunn, 26, who lived in Lincoln Park. The accident occurred at 9:35 p.m., according to police
reports.
The technician "was traumatized
as much as someone can be traumatized that he didn't get there in time, and
that (Lunn) was so innocent," said the
investigator, who requested anonymity.
The account, confirmed by federal
and state sources involved in the investigation, is the fullest yet of what
unfolded at the crossing, where crews had been working to fix a glitch in the
warning system.
On Tuesday, the Tribune reported
that findings from the ongoing investigation indicate that the grade-crossing
protection system at Stuenkel Road in the southern
suburb was inadvertently turned off by track maintenance crews installing a
nearby interlocking, which controls track switches and train movements at
crossings and junctions.
With no safety backstops in place,
an unintentional trap was set for some unfortunate driver, who happened to be Lunn, investigators found.
Video taken from the Amtrak
locomotive, numerous witness accounts and data downloaded from the control
cabinet at the crossing all confirmed that the protective gates and warning
devices failed to operate, according to officials with the Federal Railroad
Administration, which is leading the accident probe.
Earlier in the day, CN supervisors
and crew members knew they had problems. After trains passed through the
crossing, the gates and warning devices continued to operate, blocking traffic
and creating a false impression to motorists that at least one train was still
approaching, investigators said.
By late Friday afternoon, CN
officials thought they had the problem resolved on the double set of tracks.
Three of the four approaches to the crossing -- two southbound and one
northbound -- were tested when trains approached at different speeds depending
on whether they were carrying freight or passengers. The warning devices and
gates activated properly at least 20 seconds before the trains entered the
crossing, officials said.
Throughout much of the day, an order
was in effect requiring trains to either stop short of the crossing at the
instructions of personnel holding flags or reduce speed to 15 mph through the
crossing. Apparently confident that the slow order was no longer needed,
railroad officials lifted it several hours before the accident, investigators
determined.
But officials are still combing
through documents and conducting interviews with CN personnel and the
manufacturer of the crossing equipment to understand why fail-safe procedures
were not put in place as a backstop if the final scheduled test of the
crossing's warning apparatus were to fail.
Amtrak train No. 392, the Illini
going to Chicago Union Station from Carbondale, was the final test train,
officials said. The train, which was briefly delayed in Kankakee, was running
just under the 79 mph speed limit through the University Park crossing.
A dance competition where some of Lunn's students performed had just ended at nearby
Governors State University, and a steady stream of traffic was heading toward
the tracks. Lunn's car was sandwiched between other
vehicles that had braked for a stop
sign as the Amtrak train crossed the
roadway, investigators said.
Two motorists who drove over the
tracks moments before the train hit Lunn's SUV told
authorities the crossing gates did not go down and the lights failed to flash.
One driver recalled seeing a
"puff of dirt" as Lunn's vehicle was hit.
The wreckage looked like a "ball of metal," she said.
After destroying Lunn's
vehicle, the Amtrak train continued on for 2,200 feet before the engineer could
bring it to a stop, according to investigators.
"Where was the fail-safe to
prevent this tragedy? That's where the problem lies," an investigator
said. "(CN) didn't do it right. There is speculation as to why they did
what they did, but an accurate picture will emerge at the end of our
investigation."
Even the most diligent defensive drivers,
seeing no lowered gates, lights or bells yet still expecting a train to come
out of nowhere at virtually every railroad crossing, would have had no chance
to escape the Amtrak train, according to authorities re-creating the events
leading to the accident that killed Lunn.
But a technology that is in the
early stages of being deployed in the U.S. could have led to a different
ending.
The technology, placed on board
locomotives, is called positive train control. In Friday's crossing-equipment
failure, a positive train control system would have notified the Amtrak
engineer both that a vehicle was on the tracks and that the crossing system was
inoperable. Even if the engineer failed to heed the warning, the positive train
control system would have stopped the train.
"Positive train control is
probably the most significant safety initiative in the history of railroading
and certainly something that would have the ability to prevent a tragedy like
this," said Joseph Szabo, the administrator of
the Federal Railroad Administration who was in Chicago on Tuesday attending a
congressional field hearing on high-speed rail.
In the situation at University Park,
a positive train control system on board the Amtrak train would have detected
at least 1 mile out from the crossing whether the protection system at Stuenkel Road was powered up and in service, investigators
said. In addition, confirmation would have been given to the train engineer at
least 4,000 feet from the crossing that the gates and lights had successfully
deployed.
The nation's railroads last week
faced a deadline to submit their proposals for implementing positive train
control. The railroads have until the end of 2015 to fully install and operate
the system.
But there is resistance among some
freight railroads to include crossings in the initial rollout of positive train
control. The freight carriers see positive train control as providing huge
efficiency benefits, but they are concerned about the cost of equipping their
fleets with systems that detect blockages on tracks and malfunctioning
crossings.